Recently, debate over a "new Yalta" has gained noticeable traction in Europe. The term "new Yalta" refers to a revival of the Yalta model. In 1945, as the Second World War was drawing to a close, Soviet, American and British leaders met at Yalta to arrange the post-war world order, setting the stage for the subsequent Cold War. While the Yalta Conference accelerated the downfall of German and Japanese fascism, it bore distinct hallmarks of great-power hegemony, as it carved up spheres of influence over the heads of smaller nations and sacrificed their sovereignty. The revival of the Yalta narrative in Europe reflects the European bloc’s anxiety over being marginalised in the Russia-Ukraine conflict – the worry that China, the United States and Russia could hammer out conflict settlements and decide Europe's security future without it. 

In fact, Europe's biggest anxiety originates from the USA. Long reliant on Washington as its main security anchor, Europe has built its security strategy around American backing. The United States and Europe once stood united on the Russia-Ukraine conflict but the American position has now shifted.  

The Trump administration characterised the conflict as a "European issue", halted direct military and financial aid to Ukraine, sought to improve relations with Russia, accused Ukraine and Europe of dragging out the conflict, and kept Europe on the sidelines of peace mediation. Therefore, when it comes to the "new Yalta" Europe has real cause for concern. 

Fraying US-Ukraine ties alongside warming US-Russia relations, compounded by Ukraine's dire straits, Europe's deepening economic, social and political woes and widespread violent protests across the continent, have only amplified such fears. 

Europe's jitters reveal its failure to grasp the global shift towards multipolarity and the democratisation of international relations. It still sees itself and the world through a Eurocentric or Western-centric lens. The anxiety over the "new Yalta" exposes Europe's deep entanglement in outdated ways of thinking. 

 First, confrontational thinking. Having lost its hegemonic status after the Second World War, Europe perpetuated this confrontational mind-set under the umbrella of a US-led Western hegemony. The Cold War was defined by bloc rivalry, and even after it had ended, Europe continued to engage with the world along value lines, shunning countries with divergent values. Alone or alongside the USA, Europe exports ‘democracy’ and has even resorted to force for regime change. By pushing the dual eastward expansion of the European Union and NATO to expand its sphere of influence, Europe has steadily built up frictions with Russia. This stand-off with Russia has in turn seriously undermined Europe's own interests. 

 

Second, a mind-set of dependency. As a collective of developed nations, the EU has long fallen into an entrenched habit of dependence on the USA which has always prioritised its own interests. No matter who occupies the White House, the United States will keep pursuing its "America First" strategy. Europe is aware of this, yet still clings to wishful thinking. This all-encompassing dependence across security, energy, market, finance and technology means Europe can do little when confronted with US bullying and humiliation. 

 

Third, exclusionary thinking. Although Europe's strength and global influence have been on the wane, Eurocentrism still dominates its mind-set. Europe has long practised double standards, showing tolerance and indulgence toward its own and "in-group” partners while rejecting and targeting countries it views as outliers. While nominally advocating multilateralism, in practice it merely seeks co-operation with like-minded states. It prioritises its own interests while disregarding the legitimate concerns of others.  

 

On the Ukraine issue, for instance, Europe over-emphasises its own security while ignoring Russia's security concerns, even turning a blind eye to Ukraine's heavy toll. Rather than attempting to understand countries with divergent stances, Europe resorts to unrelenting criticism and sanctions. This mind-set reinforces zero-sum games and hinders multilateral cooperation needed to resolve complex issues. 

These outdated mind-sets are out of touch with reality and keep eroding Europe's own interests – this lies at the root of Europe's anxiety. The new era will not tolerate Yalta-style transactional politics. China advocates co-operation on an equal footing and mutual benefit among nations and opposes such transactional bargaining. Europe was once a participant in the transactional politics of great powers and should not project its own past onto others. What Europe truly needs now is to abandon the old thinking, forge a new model and achieve genuine strategic autonomy.